The New Poor

[prole]

The reality is that the only way to *preserve* employment at current levels in the public sector at the state and local level is via reductions in pay and benefits. Financing your own retirement, paying a greater share of health care costs, etc, etc, etc - the stuff that virtually everyone in the private sector is doing already.

 

AND FAILING MISERABLY AT!!! WAKE UP!!! IT'S NOT WORKING!!!

[kukuzka1]

pinto beans + h20 + simmer = goodness

[Fairweather]

Reduce state payroll and benefits now.

[ivan]

Reduce state payroll and benefits now.

kill kkkonservative numbnuts now!

[prole]

From the article posted above, it seems more important that the State be finding ways to put people to work rather than finding ways to increase the ranks of underemployed and those lacking health-care.

[Fairweather]

Reduce state payroll and benefits now.

kill kkkonservative numbnuts now!

 

180 days' work should receive 180 days' pay.

[JayB]

The reality is that the only way to *preserve* employment at current levels in the public sector at the state and local level is via reductions in pay and benefits. Financing your own retirement, paying a greater share of health care costs, etc, etc, etc - the stuff that virtually everyone in the private sector is doing already.

 

AND FAILING MISERABLY AT!!! WAKE UP!!! IT'S NOT WORKING!!!

 

By "not working" you must mean "financing every last penny of public employee wages, benefits, and pensions."

 

But I agree that there are virtually no circumstances in which the growth of tax revenues under any reasonable forecast and any tax regime likely to endure for more than a single election cycle can come anywhere near covering the tab for the said pay and benefits. Right now future liabilities for public retiree health benefits are roughly 5% funded.

 

The model under which government unions promote maninfestly un-fundable compensation schemes that drive both business and citizens out of their states is failing miserably, is not working, and it's time for the public employee unions to wake up before a taxpayer revolt tosses them out of the bed they've spent the last few decades feathering.

 

 

[ivan]

Reduce state payroll and benefits now.

kill kkkonservative numbnuts now!

 

180 days' work should receive 180 days' pay.

you n' lionel barrymore (minus the hawt-daughter) have plenty in common

[G-spotter]

fund acid flashbacks

[prole]

The reality is that the only way to *preserve* employment at current levels in the public sector at the state and local level is via reductions in pay and benefits. Financing your own retirement, paying a greater share of health care costs, etc, etc, etc - the stuff that virtually everyone in the private sector is doing already.

 

AND FAILING MISERABLY AT!!! WAKE UP!!! IT'S NOT WORKING!!!

 

By "not working" you must mean "financing every last penny of public employee wages, benefits, and pensions."

 

But I agree that there are virtually no circumstances in which the growth of tax revenues under any reasonable forecast and any tax regime likely to endure for more than a single election cycle can come anywhere near covering the tab for the said pay and benefits. Right now future liabilities for public retiree health benefits are roughly 5% funded.

 

The model under which government unions promote maninfestly un-fundable compensation schemes that drive both business and citizens out of their states is failing miserably, is not working, and it's time for the public employee unions to wake up before a taxpayer revolt tosses them out of the bed they've spent the last few decades feathering.

 

 

No, what's not working is pretending that this austerity proposal isn't the same "drown the government in the bathtub", "corporate tax cuts or else" set of policy prescriptions that you folks have been pushing for years and that's left Americans poorer, dumber, and angrier as a result. It's tired and using the crisis you've created as an excuse to force down more of the same medicine is simply gross. That this "common sense" is coming from the two usual suspects should clue anyone in that it's a nightmare of an idea.

[prole]

...it's time for the public employee unions to wake up before a taxpayer revolt tosses them out of the bed they've spent the last few decades feathering.

 

Wow, what a great opportunity for one of your monographs on the dangers of "mob rule". For some reason I don't think we'll see one.

[billcoe]

While we wait to see if you eventually will have something positive to offer Prole -for your consideration, the new Chinese banking schema. Short version cartoon summation:

 

Short version summation:

"Yet, actions have consequences. The US global advantage is impermanent. During the next quarter century, the role of other powers, Europe, China, perhaps even Russia will increase. The American challenge is to husband its advantage wisely. That means fostering a global structure of relations that advances US long-term interests in which other major players feel they have more of a stake in cooperating than in obstructing."

 

seen here:

..and here:

http://www.thenewamerican.com/index.php/world-mainmenu-26/asia-mainmenu-33/2917-china-reacs-to-us-arms-sale-to-taiwan

"Major General Luo Yuan issued a warning that China could attack the United States “by oblique means and stealthy feints."

 

 

 

..alternatively, full text here describing the global economy which both sides of the aisle have supported for many years. All that's left is to outsource our government bureaucratic functions and we'll all be on vacation all the time: http://www.dni.gov/nic/confreports_asiaUSoutlook.html#link03

 

"Trends in Chinese Assessments

of the United States, 2000-2005

 

by Bonnie S. Glaser

 

No country presents such vexing contradictions for China as the United States. The maintenance of good Sino-American relations is indispensable for China's continued economic growth. Without sustained high levels of US direct investment and an open US market for Chinese goods, China's aspiration to become a middle-level developed country by 2050 will be difficult, if not impossible, to realize. The preservation of a favorable security environment for China and the achievement of reunification with Taiwan also are, in part, contingent on the state of Chinese ties with the United States.

 

Yet, at the opening of the 21st century, Beijing is uncertain about the feasibility of securing a stable Sino-US relationship. Chinese leaders harbor strong suspicions about US intentions globally as well as toward China. The Chinese fear that Washington is determined to prevent the rise of a strong China that could pose a challenge to American supremacy in the new century. They also worry about US resolve to spread American values and transform China and other remaining socialist and authoritarian governments into Western-style democracies. Beijing is especially uneasy about the advent of an extremely imbalanced global pattern of power in which America's might vastly outstrips other nations and provides the United States with the unilateral means to advance its interests as it sees fit. Chinese complaints are targeted at fundamental American foreign and defense policies such as post-Cold War NATO strategy, the deepening of security ties to Japan and plans to develop and deploy missile defense systems on the continental United States as well as around China's periphery to protect American forward-deployed forces and possibly American friends and allies in Asia from ballistic missile threats.

 

Although debates in China are ongoing about US foreign policy and intentions toward China, the parameters of those debates have narrowed substantially over the past year. There is now greater agreement among Chinese America specialists than previously existed in their analysis of the overall international situation as well as specific elements such as US strategy and objectives toward China. Minority positions are still held, but they seem to carry little weight in the policymaking process. Thus, this paper presents primarily mainstream perspectives on the United States, which currently dominate the formulation of Chinese policy.

 

The task of predicting how Chinese attitudes toward the US policy and presence in the Asia-Pacific region will change over the next five years is a challenging one. This situation is in part because Chinese assessments of the United States and its intentions toward China are primarily reactive, and US policies as well as other external events influencing Beijing's estimates in the next five years cannot be predicted with certainty. We can forecast with a degree of confidence, however, that Chinese ambivalence about American power will endure. Moreover, Chinese suspicions about US intentions toward China probably will not be significantly assuaged and may even intensify during this period. This paper attempts to present current circumstances and trends in Chinese evaluations of US policy and identify key variables that may influence Chinese attitudes and approaches toward the United States between 2000 and 2005. The conclusion draws implications for Chinese foreign policy and US interests.

Current Trends in Chinese Attitudes Toward

the United States

 

Chinese assessments of US policy and presence in the Asia-Pacific region flow from Beijing's estimates of US comprehensive national power relative to other major states, US global strategy and economic role, and American intentions toward China. Therefore, analysis of Chinese estimates of these broad, yet fundamental issues must precede consideration of their evaluation of US regionally based policies. Chinese perspectives on the US-Japan alliance, US policy toward Taiwan, the regional security architecture, and the Korean Peninsula are presented in turn.

 

US Reign as Sole Superpower

After the events of 1999, China reached the conclusion that the United States will continue to occupy the position of sole superpower in a global pattern of one superpower and several major powers for at least the next two decades.(1) Beijing had hoped that this power structure, which emerged after the collapse of the Soviet Union, would be short-lived and be supplanted by a multipolar pattern of power in which a core group of countries that are relatively equal in comprehensive national strength would engage in bounded competition and cooperation, effectively checking the ambitions of any single power. The prevailing imbalance of power is objectionable to China because it provides the US with an opportunity to advance a global security and ideological agenda that benefits American and broader Western interests. In Chinese parlance, the US can pursue "power politics and hegemony." At the same time, China's room to maneuver and its ability to defend its own interests are severely constrained in a unipolar international system. A multipolar global pattern that the Chinese hope will provide greater opportunities to promote and defend Chinese interests is expected to take shape gradually, but little progress is expected before 2005.

 

During the next five years, and even for several decades, as the world transitions from a bipolar to a multipolar power structure, the Chinese forecast that China will lag significantly behind the United States in key indexes of power, including economic, technological, scientific and military might. Chinese analyses of the bases of US strength stress the critical importance of America's lead in the development and application of high technology and predict that the US technological edge will enable a further consolidation of the US advantage over other powers. Two specialists on the American economy at the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations, which writes annual assessments of the international situation and the global balance of power for the Chinese leadership, forecast "the US will take the lead to enter the information world and keep its absolute superiority in developing the knowledge economy."(2) They and other Chinese experts emphasize the links between technological prowess, economic strength, and military power. Comparative assessments of the technological and economic level of potential competitors have convinced most Chinese analysts that no power is likely to rival the US position in the early part of the 21st century.

 

US Global Strategy and Intentions

The main strategic objective of the United States, from China's perspective, is to exploit the opportunity presented by its unprecedented favorable global position to further consolidate American supremacy and shape the world according to US interests and values. The United States is frequently described by Chinese analysts as in pursuit of a strategy of global "hegemony" and absolute superiority over potential rival states. US plans to deploy a national missile defense (NMD) system are viewed as an integral part of this strategy, aimed at preventing other powers from having a reliable retaliatory capability against a US first strike. PLA officers reject the US contention that concern about a missile launch by North Korea is the driving force behind consideration of the C-3 system, the more ambitious of two NMD configurations under deliberation, which envisions the emplacement of 200-250 interceptors in Alaska and North Dakota. They insist that Washington's true goal is to degrade or nullify China's nuclear deterrent.

 

The NATO military operation in Kosovo in 1999 alarmed Beijing--even before the bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade--because it demonstrated US willingness to circumvent the United Nations and employ military force to intervene in the internal affairs of other nations to advance American strategic aims. The military intervention also represented a test of NATO's "new strategic concept," which the Chinese view as intended to globalize NATO's role. The purported Clinton doctrine of "new interventionism" has been widely criticized by China for putting issues of human rights above state sovereignty.

 

During the Kosovo war and in its immediate aftermath, many Chinese feared that the United States might use similar means to interfere in states on China's periphery or even on the Chinese mainland. The possibility of US military intervention in North Korea, the South China Sea, and in the Taiwan Strait was judged to be greater than in the past. Active American interference in Tibet and Xinjiang also was considered more likely, although most Chinese researchers expected that the US would rely on political means to stir up ethnic unrest, for example, rather than use military force to meddle in Chinese minority areas. Subsequent US decisions to limit its involvement in East Timor and refrain from intervention in Chechnya, along with US reassurances that Kosovo was not a model for future US intervention abroad, alleviated the urgency of Chinese concerns, but did not eliminate them completely. The Chinese remain wary of what they see as an increased proclivity of the US to rely on military means to advance American interests.

 

More fundamentally, however, the Kosovo war served as a catalyst for a reassessment in China of US global strategy and intentions. The United States could no longer be depicted as a relatively benign world policeman whose policies in many areas served to promote regional and international stability--a view that was not universally accepted, but was actively promoted by an influential group of Chinese think tank experts and officials as the rationale for building a constructive strategic partnership with the United States. Instead, the US came to be seen by the majority as a destabilizing and unpredictable hegemon determined to use all possible means to pursue its interests and spread Western values with impunity.

 

US Economic Role and Power

Beijing recognizes that the global economy is a major factor that increasingly influences China's security. The Chinese are acutely aware that the United States is the primary engine propelling the world economy forward. Sustained strength in the US economy is essential for China's economic growth as well as for the continuing recovery of Asian states from the financial crisis. Chinese economists worry that a major correction in US financial markets or a broader US economic downturn could have a devastating impact on China's economic modernization strategy.(3) Despite rhetorical statements declaring a need to diversify Chinese markets and expand domestic demand, Beijing remains exceedingly dependent on US markets to absorb its exports. The decision to make far reaching concessions to Washington in the bilateral negotiations on China's accession to the World Trade Organization signifies the judgment by Chinese leaders that economic globalization is inevitable and that although the process carries inherent risks, China will benefit from joining the globalization trend.(4)

 

Chinese attitudes toward US economic power are obviously ambivalent, however. Chinese analysts of international affairs (in contrast to Chinese economists) especially emphasize that US economic strength has provided the foundation for stepped-up American political and military intervention. They worry that sustained US economic growth and its dominant position in scientific and technological development will encourage the United States to rely on unilateral means to achieve its global ambitions.(5) Military researchers point out that the expanding US economy has provided ample funds to support a continued increase in the US military budget. Some predict that the United States will take advantage of the weakening of the economic strength of many Asian countries to enhance American economic influence over the region.(6)

 

US Intentions Toward China

Since the Clinton administration set out its strategy of comprehensive engagement toward China in 1993, American strategy and intentions toward Beijing have been hotly debated topics among Chinese experts and officials. The events of 1999, most notably the accidental bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, have resulted in a narrowing of previously wide differences on this issue and produced a virtual consensus that the United States is striving to contain, constrain or otherwise check China. A leading analyst of American affairs noted privately in October 1999 that there is widespread acceptance in China that "the containment factor" is a prominent component in US policy toward China.

 

In accordance with America's global strategic ambitions, the United States is viewed as being determined to prevent China from challenging its preeminent position regionally and globally. Many in China contend that the United States seeks to slow the growth of China's economic power as well as its development of science and technology to ensure that Chinese military weapons and capabilities continue to lag far behind those of the United States. Another US objective identified by Chinese is to promote democracy and the rule of law in China, which many believe extends to a desire to undermine Communist Party rule. Perpetuating the separation of Taiwan from the mainland is also considered to be an important goal of US strategy. The official characterization of US intentions by senior Chinese leaders and in official documents as aimed at "Westernizing," "splitting" and "weakening" China apparently now are widely accepted.

 

US efforts to improve relations with states on China's periphery are interpreted by many in Beijing as intended to better position Washington for strategic competition with China in the future. The strengthening of the US-Japan military alliance, including the new Defense Guidelines, recently fortified US military arrangements with several Southeast Asian states as well as with Central Asian states bordering China, and US plans to deploy theater missile defense (TMD) systems in the region are cited by Chinese experts as evidence of a US strategic design to encircle China. Discussion of possible inclusion of Taiwan in a "regionwide" US defense missile system on China's periphery also has intensified Chinese suspicions that the United States views China as likely to emerge as a strategic adversary in the next century.

 

A small number of liberal-minded, Western-educated Chinese experts view Washington's objectives in pursuing relations with Beijing as relatively benign and even in China's long-term national interests. For example, US goals of opening up the Chinese economy, promoting democracy and the rule of law in China, and encouraging Chinese adherence to global norms on everything from nuclear nonproliferation to military transparency to human rights are considered by these individuals as prodding Beijing to make policy choices that are difficult but essential for China's attainment of its aim of enhancing Chinese comprehensive national power in the new century. Even these experts are worried, however, that unprecedented US global power and its impatience for change in Chinese internal and external policies could result in increased US pressure on China that could have destabilizing consequences for Sino-American relations as well as regional and global stability. Many also are anxious about the dangerous mix of a continued trend toward independence in Taiwan, growing nationalistic fervor in China in support of the use of military force to prevent permanent separation of the island from the mainland, and increasingly resolute US determination to defend Taiwan from a Chinese military attack.

 

US-Japan Alliance

Chinese perspectives on the US-Japan alliance are undergoing a sea change.(7) In the past, Beijing judged that, on balance, the presence of American forces in Japan and the US nuclear umbrella over Japan benefited China by: effectively checking Japan's ambitions for regional hegemony; restraining the buildup of an independent Japanese military capability and limiting Japan's ability to project military power; and providing reassurance to other Asian states that worried about China's growing economic, political, and military power. In the early 1990s, China even feared that economic friction between Washington and Tokyo could spill over into the security realm and cause a rupture of the alliance, triggering Japanese rearmament.

 

The signing of the Joint Declaration on the Alliance for the 21st Century by President Bill Clinton and Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto in April 1996 and the subsequent process of revising the Defense Guidelines governing wartime US-Japan cooperation prompted a heated debate in China about the US-Japan alliance and its impact on Chinese security interests. The Chinese suspect that the primary motive behind efforts by Tokyo and Washington to reinvigorate the security treaty and expand its area of coverage is a desire to counter the rise of Chinese power. In addition, the provision in the new guidelines that allows for US and Japanese forces to jointly respond to undefined emergencies in the Far East has heightened Chinese concern that the US and Japanese militaries will buttress their capabilities to respond with force in the event that Beijing seeks to militarily intimidate or take over Taiwan.

 

China is increasingly skeptical about the role of the alliance in restricting Japan's acquisition of power projection forces. Chinese military and civilian analysts contend that the security treaty provides Japan with a cover to develop a broad range of military capabilities, and many forecast that Japan will eventually sever itself from the United States and pursue its security interests on its own. Instead of serving as a check on Japanese regional ambitions, the alliance is now viewed as accelerating Japan's development into a "normal" country that shoulders greater responsibility for regional security, a trend that China finds worrisome. The Chinese also maintain that modification of the Defense Guidelines to allow for regional wartime cooperation between American and Japanese forces has stimulated support in Japan for revising the Peace Constitution to include the right of "collective self-defense." Revision of Japan's constitution would mark a major watershed in Japanese post-World War II history and probably would have extremely negative consequences for Sino-Japanese relations. "

 

 

 

[j_b]

No, what's not working is pretending that this austerity proposal isn't the same "drown the government in the bathtub", "corporate tax cuts or else" set of policy prescriptions that you folks have been pushing for years and that's left Americans poorer, dumber, and angrier as a result. It's tired and using the crisis you've created as an excuse to force down more of the same medicine is simply gross. That this "common sense" is coming from the two usual suspects should clue anyone in that it's a nightmare of an idea.

 

Regressive neo-feudalists have learned how to pit public sector employees against private sector employees to bust unions and benefits, young people against old people to bust social security and Medicare, etc .... same old tired tactics of divide and conquer to impose unpopular policies.

[billcoe]

Regressive neo-feudalists have learned how to pit public sector employees against private sector employees to bust unions and benefits, young people against old people to bust social security and Medicare, etc .... same old tired tactics of divide and conquer to impose unpopular policies.

 

A negative plus a negative is not a positive. Please don't take this the wrong way, but can we conclude that all you 2 can do in lieu of anything positive or informative is whine and attack? Shit, I suspect that you both learned in college that one could pass for an intellectual by complaining endlessly. Shit, the reality is that in the real world, any idiot can complain and whine. Yet at the end of the day 2 negatives are not a positive.

[j_b]

While we wait to see if you eventually will have something positive to offer Prole

 

So, today, reneging on pension contracts is "positive" Bill? Your labeling things and people negative (or not positive) is transparent.

 

Anybody noticed how Bill is always happy to carry JayB's water when JayB advocates pro-corporate policies, even though Bill defends himself from being conservative?

[j_b]

A negative plus a negative is not a positive. Please don't take this the wrong way, but can we conclude that all you 2 can do in lieu of anything positive or informative is whine and attack? Shit, I suspect that you both learned in college that one could pass for an intellectual by complaining endlessly. Shit, the reality is that in the real world, any idiot can complain and whine. Yet at the end of the day 2 negatives are not a positive.

 

As I said the "you're so negative" shtick is tiresome. I have made lots of positive proposals and they certainly don't consist of making average folks pay for the crisis manufactured by economic elites.

[billcoe]

While we wait to see if you eventually will have something positive to offer Prole

 

So, today, reneging on pension contracts is "positive" Bill? Your labeling things and people negative (or not positive) is transparent.

What pension contracts are we discussing? Where in this thread is this?

Anybody noticed how Bill is always happy to carry JayB's water when JayB advocates pro-corporate policies, even though Bill defends himself from being conservative?

I hope everyone has noticed this except you jb. See, listening to Jayb as a minimum will preserve your capitol and save your ass(ets), it may even make you money and get you rich. Whereas I have yet to see one post from either you or Prole which has done either. I may have missed it, if so - can you link it?

Edited February 22, 2010 by billcoe

[j_b]

it may even make you money and get you rich

 

ROTFL

[billcoe]

listening to Jayb as a minimum will preserve your capitol and save your ass(ets), it may even make you money and get you rich. Whereas I have yet to see one post from either you or Prole which has done either. I may have missed it, if so - can you link it?

ROTFL

Hmmm, OK then, so you can't find anything you've ever posted that fits the parameters, you can pony something up right now. But it's OK if you can't.....got any good rock fall or climbing stories?

 

 

[j_b]

Bill, I have spewed here for years making proposals toward creating a sustainable economy. If you have missed all of it, nothing I can say now is going to be very useful for you.

[billcoe]

Bill, I have spewed here for years making proposals toward creating a sustainable economy. If you have missed all of it, nothing I can say now is going to be very useful for you.

 

That's what I thought.

 

 

[billcoe]

Here's one from April 2006 for instance. Bold is mine, otherwise unchanged.

 

"

There's something in the neighborhood of 2 trillion worth of ARM debt scheduled to reset before the end of '07. In most coastal markets mortgage-to-rent, mortgage-to-income, and the percentage of homes purchased by non-occupants have reached all time highs (40% of all purchases in '05). Equity extraction via HELOC and MEW and cash-out refis have reached all-time highs. The yen-based carry trade is unwinding, the value of credit-default swaps for MBS portfolios has been skyrocketing, and people are starting to get a tad worried about the fact that the valuations that underly the MBS portfolios reflect systemic appraisal fraud. What's it all mean?

 

My prediction is that San Diego, Orange County,

San Francisco, Coastal Florida, most population centers in New England, Phoenix/Tucson, Las Vegas, and a big chunk of Colorado will see rising foreclosure activity, ballooning inventories, and price stagnation through the end of '07, with real price declines occuring at various rates through '10.

 

Seattle is tougher to call, but the population/wage picture doesn't look terribly conducive to future appreciation. The fact that I've spoken to MD's who have ruled out Seattle due to the cost of housing should give the RE cheerleaders a bit of pause IMO.

 

As an aside, you might check the real estate owned picture that the banks see for any of those cities to see how accurate Jayb's post of 4 years ago was. In fact, there were arguments on this board with Jayb suggesting that renting may be better than buying, and giving a detailed post why.

[prole]

See, listening to Jayb as a minimum will preserve your capitol and save your ass(ets), it may even make you money and get you rich. Whereas I have yet to see one post from either you or Prole which has done either. I may have missed it, if so - can you link it?

 

Except that by all indications, intergenerational mobility, the metric by which movement between classes is measured, has actually declined under the Reagan/Thatcherite policies of which Jay_B is a proponent. The rich getting richer and occasional Beverly Hillbilly or The Jeffersons aside, the notion that Americans have more opportunities to "get ahead" under conservative economic policy is pure horseshit.

 

Rags to Rags

 

Britain More Class Bound Than Ever

 

Movin' On Up?

[j_b]

Housing market tumble forecast / Economists see bubble bursting by late next year

June 21, 2005|By Kelly Zito, Chronicle Staff Writer

 

A long-predicted correction in the high-flying housing market could steer the economy into a recession as early as late 2006, according to a forecast to be released today.

 

Economists at the prominent UCLA Anderson Forecast have anticipated a real estate downturn for a couple of years, but they have stepped up their warnings in their latest quarterly report.

 

The reason? Home values simply have flown too high, too fast. In California, for example, home prices have vaulted 70 percent in the past five years, compared with 55 percent in the mid-1970s and 45 percent in the late 1980s.

 

"Prices are not associated with reality," said UCLA economist Christopher Thornberg, whose paper on the state's economy is subtitled "Beware the Froth!" Home buyers "are gambling on massive amounts of appreciation, and it's not worth the price compared to the rental value. It's a house of cards."

Edited February 22, 2010 by j_b

[j_b]

Yo Bill, you want a tip to make money? Move to Somalia, you'll save in taxes. If you don't pay taxes you'll be rich right?