avalanche

[Jim]

Received this from a friend - sucks.

 

Dear Friends -

 

Some you might have read recent news accounts regarding the large number of avalanche incidents, including fatalities, in British Columbia this year. I am sorry to say that I was involved in one such incident on March 17th. I figured that sooner or later you would hear or learn about this event, so I have prepared an account of what transpired. I am OK and getting on with life, lucky to and so happy to be alive and have Chris and Ada, heartbroken at the deaths of two dear friends.

 

Grizzly Slide, March 17th, 2003

 

 

 

There were six of us were skiing out of the Slocan Chief cabin, a backcountry hut located in Kokanee Glacier Park, in the Selkirk Mountains of BC. We had been taking trips into backcountry huts to ski and hang out together each winter for the last ten years. We were good friends, experienced mountaineers and careful backcountry skiers. We spent lots of time each trip digging snow pits and assessing slope stability. We were generally conservative in our predications, and had turned our backs on lots of slopes that we rated unsafe. We carried avalanche transceivers, probes and shovels and practiced using them.

 

There had been extreme avalanche activity the week before we arrived with some of the largest avalanches in decades in that area. It appeared that many of the larger bowls had cleared out, and that the avalanche cycle was winding down and that the slopes were tightening up and becoming safer.

 

We skied very conservatively the first two days, getting a feel for the terrain and investigating the snow conditions. On the day of the accident we went out in the morning with a snow ranger and excavated a very large snow pit. We performed replicate snow compression tests and a rutchblock or ski-block test. We obtained low to moderate scores that were very favorable for skiing. While these tests were not representative of the snow everywhere, we felt comfortable with heading up and then performing additional stability tests before skiing in new terrain.

 

The weather was clear and calm as we looked ahead and sketched out a route to an open glade. It was located above a broad shoulder of tree-covered benches known as Grizzly Benches that we had skied two days prior. We agreed beforehand that we would turn around if found the conditions were unstable.

 

We were nervous but excited as we set out. We gave a wide birth to treeless Grizzly bowl. As was our custom we spread out and headed uphill using a "safe route" along ridges and through trees that were not avalanche prone. The lead group putting in the up-track stopped to rest at the top of Grizzly Benches. I took over in the lead, with Ron Gregg and James Schmidt behind me. Ron and I conferred and decided to approach a relatively small slope above us and dig another test pit to evaluate the stability of the slope. Tim ONeill, Scott Tobiason, and Jon Heller were waiting and watching behind us. I made a curving traverse of the nearly flat bench, heading for a group of trees at the base of a low ridge. I had just made a kick-turn onto the toe of the uphill slope when there was a very loud WHUMP! The whole bench settled underneath us.

 

A weaker layer deep in the snow pack had collapsed under our combined weights. We stood frozen and looked first up the slope and then back at each other. The air was perfectly still. A relatively small section of the slope above us began to slide. It appeared to be no more than a surface sluff, which we could handle. I was looking back down the slope at Ron. He was staring intently up at the slope behind me when a thunderous BOOM shocked the silence. I looked back uphill where I could see a massive face breaking away about 300-500 feet above. This slope had been shielded from our view by a break in the ridge. Ron yelled, “ski like hell!”

 

I threw myself down the hill. There was a lone tree standing about 150 feet below me. “I have to reach that tree,” I thought. Suddenly a huge wave of snow was pouring down onto us from above, breaking apart the trees that we thought were protecting us. I was swept up in a roar of moving snow. I was swimming, trying to stay upright. I hit the tree, a ski on either side and threw my arms around it. The rush of snow propelled me up the tree, the snow folding over and pressing against me with massive exhausting pressure. I thought: “this is It” and blacked-out.

 

Below us at the edge of the bench Tim, Scott, and Jon had watched me turn and ski downhill. They watched Ron and James, who were facing uphill on flatter terrain, try to turn and ski away from the slide. They watched them fall over and try to get up, only to be overwhelmed and disappear into the rising flood of snow.

 

Then it all stopped. I could breath. I yelled out” I’m okay, don’t worry about me!” Tim, Scott, and Jon immediately moved out across the slide, searching with their transceivers, seeking a signal.

They quickly found one and began digging furiously. It was Ron, but he was buried deep, with almost 3 meters of snow on top of him. Meanwhile I had pulled my shovel off my pack and was digging myself free. It was taking forever – I was so locked into the snow. Finally I was free to help the others dig. Jon set out to find the other signal. He quickly located James' signal and with Tim began digging.

 

There was so much snow. And they were both buried too deeply. The Coroner later told us that they had perhaps 3-4 minutes - it took us 30 minutes to get to James' airway and about 50 minutes to get to Ron. We had had to move about 14 cubic yards of snow to get to Ron, and about 4 cubic yards of snow to locate James. When we found them there was no “ice mask” covering their faces to indicate that they had been breathing under the snow. I prefer to believe that they blacked out under the crushing snow and quickly died from mechanical asphyxiation.

 

I wanted to tell you this story so that you would know that we were well prepared and that we were not being reckless. We were doing something we all loved and took precautions to manage the risk. Our preparation and plans did not prevent or predict the conditions that we encountered. It is small consolation that the avalanche technicians who investigated the scene could find no fault with our route or actions; they said we could rescue them any time and that they didn't know that they wouldn't have been in the same location on the slope.

 

I have spent the last two weekends at memorial services. The two friends that I lost were both larger than life individuals who left huge holes in our communities with their passing. I have included their obituaries so that you could know a little about them.

 

The silver lining in this has been the immense outpouring of concern and support that we have felt from friends and neighbors. I did not send this to a long list of people. Please share this with others that you think should know or would want to know.

 

Love to you all:

 

 

 

 

 

[glen]

Thank you for posting this.

[iain]

I'm so sorry for your loss.

[Figger_Eight]

[rbw1966]

My thoughts go out to you. Tragic loss.

[Billygoat]

I really feel for the survivors. That letter makes my nerves tingle.

[Ursa_Eagle]

sobering and frightening

[DPS]

Did M.B write this?

[j_b]

yes, quite sobering to think they did everything right. is this another case when avalungs or such may have made a difference?

[Figger_Eight]

RE: Avalungs

 

Probably not. It seems they died from the sheer weight of the snow collapsing their lungs.

[j_b]

good point - my bad for skipping a critical sentence.

[skyclimb]

man, sorry to hear that.

[fern]

quote:"He was staring intently up at the slope behind me when a thunderous BOOM shocked the silence. I looked back uphill where I could see a massive face breaking away about 300-500 feet above. This slope had been shielded from our view by a break in the ridge."

 

maybe a map would have helped for understanding the surrounding terrain and exposure.

 

[j_b]

the problem is that triggering a slab 100's feet away is a very rare occurence (apparently not this year in eastern BC). i am not sure how realistic it is to expect eliminating this kind of hazard on most tours worth skiing. perhaps canceling all trips to regions where such hazard is said to exist?