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Everything posted by billcoe
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2010 Beacon Rock Peregrine Monitoring Journal
billcoe replied to JosephH's topic in Columbia River Gorge
Here Kevin: Kennys post explained -
Best to just call the local Forest Service and ask. They cruise those roads and would probably know exactly how far you could get in there as well.
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Update! the son of the alleged father feels bad and will testify against his alleged dad. Turns out that the kids myspace page ratted him out. http://www.kgw.com/news/national/Teen-expected-to-testify-against-dad-in-brutal-attack-on-skier.html "PORTLAND, Ore. -- The teen accused, along with his father, of a brutal attack and carjacking on a cross country skier last year in the Columbia Gorge has agreed to testify against his dad as part of a plea deal. Michael and Teven Collins previously pleaded not guilty in court. They face first degree attempted murder and robbery charges. The pair stands accused of brutally attacking cross-country skier Robert Kevin Tracey, of Washougal, on February 9th, 2009 and leaving him for dead in the snow. Police say the Collins' beat Tracey with a wooden club, dragged his body into the woods and stole his black Ford Explorer and wallet. Teven pleaded guilty Friday and his sentencing was expected Thursday. The father and son were captured in Mexico and then extradited to Portland. “He (Teven) is sick of living a lie. He wants to look the victim in the eye and say he’s sorry, “ said Randy Krog, Teven Collins’ attorney. “It’s going to be hard (to testify against his dad) but he wants to do the right thing.“ "It's a situation where it's my job to make sure justice is done," said prosecutor Christopher Lanz. Lanz cannot discuss the details of the case against the Collins. He did, however, talk to KGW about the process of prosecuting such a high-profile pair. Lanz said he expects to double the prospective jury pool in the event the case goes to trial. Victim struggling with emotions "I was relieved that they werent on the run anymore," he said "Right now I need to focus on being a good witness and making sure the public is not subjected to any more crimes by these two," Travey told KGW. A tip from an 'America's Most Wanted' TV show episode led police to 33-year-old Michael and 16-year-old Teven, who were missing since early February. If Teven Collins had not logged into this Myspace account, investigators would have never known he was in Mexico, according to Skamania County Sheriff Dave Brown. The moment Collins logged in, he left a virtual fingerprint for investigators. "Myspace would have a record, the isp he used would have a record, if he used a phone service to get to that isp they would have a record," Portland State University professor and computer forensic expert Craig Schiller told KGW. "It's kind of like a jigsaw puzzle together," Skamania Sheriff spokesman Dave Brown said. "This is a huge piece of that puzzle and were going to turn that corner now and hopefully we can get them back here and we can start the processes in the court. Marshals had been monitoring the MySpace accounts of the father and son and knew they were in Ensenada, Mexico, but not exactly where until a tip came in. Flanked by heavy guards, the two were taken in to custody at a home in Ensenada Wednesday morning and later, across the border. Michael Collins was also a sex offender with an outstanding arrest warrant for failing to meet his requirements to register. (KGW Reporter Anne Yeager contributed to this report)" LOL! A fate worse than death!
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I don't think you really care a fig what I really think. I can answer the question if you are serious. However, to better understand what your sentence is about, let me ask what you mean: other than perhaps an attempt at a put down so as to make yourself feel superior, what is a "regressive"? Is that someone who believes that the constitution is a well thought out document and one which should be followed? If you answer yes, I think both of those gentlemen would think themselves in that camp. Then where does that leave you as a "progressive" vis-a-vis the constitution? Progressives want to move beyond the constitution perhaps? To.....say like the superior Political situation which is in China or the Soviet Union perhaps? If you mean like progressive like Teddy Roosevelt, then is a regressive some one who dislikes anything other than big business control? I don't truly know what a "regressive" is.
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Changing the subject: I know that we both decry the Bush tax breaks for the wealthy. For myself, I thought Clinton said it best when he said it didn't make any sense to borrow the money from the Chinese and indebt everyone in the country into the future so that we could just give it to rich people who didn't need it and were not asking for it. Indeed, depressions are often correlated with concentration of great wealth out of the hands of the many and into the hands of the few. For those getting hit by this, it sucks, and I do not believe it is over by a long shot. Regards to all Bill
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Hey look JB, wish you said that you already knew everything there was to know and that everything the rest of us say doesn't make a flying fuck to begin with, cause you would have spared me the time of trying to think you were interested in learning something. I guess that I don't need to waste my time again. Good by.
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Bt why didn't you use the ? Dude! I so totally blew it. Does it come before, during or after the words? ....is it too late and can I use one of these? or Nice Phil Graham thinggy!
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yeah, but who got the pagetop? heh heh
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Frankly I don't understand your logic. What's JayB selling his house supposed to show about his nasty politics? btw, most serious economists have predicted a housing bubble burst for many years, as the article I posted above showed. There were articles in the press about people selling their houses and moving into rentals. So, JayB acted on it, good for him. In the meantime, he has been wrong about every single political issue I can think of (from Iraq to the trickle down nightmare and finacial deregulation) I don't think you understood what I was saying. What I am saying is that he has been right on many things and has concrete examples over many years and years of being so. I have not seen, nor have you linked, anything you have posted of similar concrete substance yourself. That you can jump on here and shit on anything and everything is not being disputed at all. That you "think" you are right is interesting, but has no substance other than inside of your own mind. As far as all the economists predicting the housing bubble, in fact the reverse was true. Few saw it. Again, perhaps you have a similar link of a call you made, but I am suspecting that you are thinking your brilliance should not be called into question and are ignoring the question:-) You are a sharp guy jb, no doubt, but I think we are discussing different things at the same time. PS, jayb isn't always right either, didn't say he was.
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PAGETOP! See Jayb's post as an indication of what I was talking about. He put his money where his mouth was, sold his house and suggested others do the same. It was quite the broohaha at the time, because most folks here thought real estate was gold forever. Turns out, Jayb hit it, on the money. Why you would ignore that kind of thing and then try and belittle someone who doesn't, indicates what, exactly?
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Here's one from April 2006 for instance. Bold is mine, otherwise unchanged. " As an aside, you might check the real estate owned picture that the banks see for any of those cities to see how accurate Jayb's post of 4 years ago was. In fact, there were arguments on this board with Jayb suggesting that renting may be better than buying, and giving a detailed post why.
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My condolences Zimzam, I always like his posts.....even his anti-KFC tirades. Bet the hens will take this hard. Are you sure it wasn't that nasty Coyote? This one was drawn by the legendary Chuck Jones brother, Lawrence, for my photographer father. They were in the Army Air corp during ww2. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chuck_Jones He probably catches the essence of your feelings well.
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Hmmm, OK then, so you can't find anything you've ever posted that fits the parameters, you can pony something up right now. But it's OK if you can't.....got any good rock fall or climbing stories?
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So, today, reneging on pension contracts is "positive" Bill? Your labeling things and people negative (or not positive) is transparent. What pension contracts are we discussing? Where in this thread is this? I hope everyone has noticed this except you jb. See, listening to Jayb as a minimum will preserve your capitol and save your ass(ets), it may even make you money and get you rich. Whereas I have yet to see one post from either you or Prole which has done either. I may have missed it, if so - can you link it?
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A negative plus a negative is not a positive. Please don't take this the wrong way, but can we conclude that all you 2 can do in lieu of anything positive or informative is whine and attack? Shit, I suspect that you both learned in college that one could pass for an intellectual by complaining endlessly. Shit, the reality is that in the real world, any idiot can complain and whine. Yet at the end of the day 2 negatives are not a positive.
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While we wait to see if you eventually will have something positive to offer Prole -for your consideration, the new Chinese banking schema. Short version cartoon summation: Short version summation: "Yet, actions have consequences. The US global advantage is impermanent. During the next quarter century, the role of other powers, Europe, China, perhaps even Russia will increase. The American challenge is to husband its advantage wisely. That means fostering a global structure of relations that advances US long-term interests in which other major players feel they have more of a stake in cooperating than in obstructing." seen here: ..and here: http://www.thenewamerican.com/index.php/world-mainmenu-26/asia-mainmenu-33/2917-china-reacs-to-us-arms-sale-to-taiwan "Major General Luo Yuan issued a warning that China could attack the United States “by oblique means and stealthy feints." ..alternatively, full text here describing the global economy which both sides of the aisle have supported for many years. All that's left is to outsource our government bureaucratic functions and we'll all be on vacation all the time: http://www.dni.gov/nic/confreports_asiaUSoutlook.html#link03 "Trends in Chinese Assessments of the United States, 2000-2005 by Bonnie S. Glaser No country presents such vexing contradictions for China as the United States. The maintenance of good Sino-American relations is indispensable for China's continued economic growth. Without sustained high levels of US direct investment and an open US market for Chinese goods, China's aspiration to become a middle-level developed country by 2050 will be difficult, if not impossible, to realize. The preservation of a favorable security environment for China and the achievement of reunification with Taiwan also are, in part, contingent on the state of Chinese ties with the United States. Yet, at the opening of the 21st century, Beijing is uncertain about the feasibility of securing a stable Sino-US relationship. Chinese leaders harbor strong suspicions about US intentions globally as well as toward China. The Chinese fear that Washington is determined to prevent the rise of a strong China that could pose a challenge to American supremacy in the new century. They also worry about US resolve to spread American values and transform China and other remaining socialist and authoritarian governments into Western-style democracies. Beijing is especially uneasy about the advent of an extremely imbalanced global pattern of power in which America's might vastly outstrips other nations and provides the United States with the unilateral means to advance its interests as it sees fit. Chinese complaints are targeted at fundamental American foreign and defense policies such as post-Cold War NATO strategy, the deepening of security ties to Japan and plans to develop and deploy missile defense systems on the continental United States as well as around China's periphery to protect American forward-deployed forces and possibly American friends and allies in Asia from ballistic missile threats. Although debates in China are ongoing about US foreign policy and intentions toward China, the parameters of those debates have narrowed substantially over the past year. There is now greater agreement among Chinese America specialists than previously existed in their analysis of the overall international situation as well as specific elements such as US strategy and objectives toward China. Minority positions are still held, but they seem to carry little weight in the policymaking process. Thus, this paper presents primarily mainstream perspectives on the United States, which currently dominate the formulation of Chinese policy. The task of predicting how Chinese attitudes toward the US policy and presence in the Asia-Pacific region will change over the next five years is a challenging one. This situation is in part because Chinese assessments of the United States and its intentions toward China are primarily reactive, and US policies as well as other external events influencing Beijing's estimates in the next five years cannot be predicted with certainty. We can forecast with a degree of confidence, however, that Chinese ambivalence about American power will endure. Moreover, Chinese suspicions about US intentions toward China probably will not be significantly assuaged and may even intensify during this period. This paper attempts to present current circumstances and trends in Chinese evaluations of US policy and identify key variables that may influence Chinese attitudes and approaches toward the United States between 2000 and 2005. The conclusion draws implications for Chinese foreign policy and US interests. Current Trends in Chinese Attitudes Toward the United States Chinese assessments of US policy and presence in the Asia-Pacific region flow from Beijing's estimates of US comprehensive national power relative to other major states, US global strategy and economic role, and American intentions toward China. Therefore, analysis of Chinese estimates of these broad, yet fundamental issues must precede consideration of their evaluation of US regionally based policies. Chinese perspectives on the US-Japan alliance, US policy toward Taiwan, the regional security architecture, and the Korean Peninsula are presented in turn. US Reign as Sole Superpower After the events of 1999, China reached the conclusion that the United States will continue to occupy the position of sole superpower in a global pattern of one superpower and several major powers for at least the next two decades.(1) Beijing had hoped that this power structure, which emerged after the collapse of the Soviet Union, would be short-lived and be supplanted by a multipolar pattern of power in which a core group of countries that are relatively equal in comprehensive national strength would engage in bounded competition and cooperation, effectively checking the ambitions of any single power. The prevailing imbalance of power is objectionable to China because it provides the US with an opportunity to advance a global security and ideological agenda that benefits American and broader Western interests. In Chinese parlance, the US can pursue "power politics and hegemony." At the same time, China's room to maneuver and its ability to defend its own interests are severely constrained in a unipolar international system. A multipolar global pattern that the Chinese hope will provide greater opportunities to promote and defend Chinese interests is expected to take shape gradually, but little progress is expected before 2005. During the next five years, and even for several decades, as the world transitions from a bipolar to a multipolar power structure, the Chinese forecast that China will lag significantly behind the United States in key indexes of power, including economic, technological, scientific and military might. Chinese analyses of the bases of US strength stress the critical importance of America's lead in the development and application of high technology and predict that the US technological edge will enable a further consolidation of the US advantage over other powers. Two specialists on the American economy at the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations, which writes annual assessments of the international situation and the global balance of power for the Chinese leadership, forecast "the US will take the lead to enter the information world and keep its absolute superiority in developing the knowledge economy."(2) They and other Chinese experts emphasize the links between technological prowess, economic strength, and military power. Comparative assessments of the technological and economic level of potential competitors have convinced most Chinese analysts that no power is likely to rival the US position in the early part of the 21st century. US Global Strategy and Intentions The main strategic objective of the United States, from China's perspective, is to exploit the opportunity presented by its unprecedented favorable global position to further consolidate American supremacy and shape the world according to US interests and values. The United States is frequently described by Chinese analysts as in pursuit of a strategy of global "hegemony" and absolute superiority over potential rival states. US plans to deploy a national missile defense (NMD) system are viewed as an integral part of this strategy, aimed at preventing other powers from having a reliable retaliatory capability against a US first strike. PLA officers reject the US contention that concern about a missile launch by North Korea is the driving force behind consideration of the C-3 system, the more ambitious of two NMD configurations under deliberation, which envisions the emplacement of 200-250 interceptors in Alaska and North Dakota. They insist that Washington's true goal is to degrade or nullify China's nuclear deterrent. The NATO military operation in Kosovo in 1999 alarmed Beijing--even before the bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade--because it demonstrated US willingness to circumvent the United Nations and employ military force to intervene in the internal affairs of other nations to advance American strategic aims. The military intervention also represented a test of NATO's "new strategic concept," which the Chinese view as intended to globalize NATO's role. The purported Clinton doctrine of "new interventionism" has been widely criticized by China for putting issues of human rights above state sovereignty. During the Kosovo war and in its immediate aftermath, many Chinese feared that the United States might use similar means to interfere in states on China's periphery or even on the Chinese mainland. The possibility of US military intervention in North Korea, the South China Sea, and in the Taiwan Strait was judged to be greater than in the past. Active American interference in Tibet and Xinjiang also was considered more likely, although most Chinese researchers expected that the US would rely on political means to stir up ethnic unrest, for example, rather than use military force to meddle in Chinese minority areas. Subsequent US decisions to limit its involvement in East Timor and refrain from intervention in Chechnya, along with US reassurances that Kosovo was not a model for future US intervention abroad, alleviated the urgency of Chinese concerns, but did not eliminate them completely. The Chinese remain wary of what they see as an increased proclivity of the US to rely on military means to advance American interests. More fundamentally, however, the Kosovo war served as a catalyst for a reassessment in China of US global strategy and intentions. The United States could no longer be depicted as a relatively benign world policeman whose policies in many areas served to promote regional and international stability--a view that was not universally accepted, but was actively promoted by an influential group of Chinese think tank experts and officials as the rationale for building a constructive strategic partnership with the United States. Instead, the US came to be seen by the majority as a destabilizing and unpredictable hegemon determined to use all possible means to pursue its interests and spread Western values with impunity. US Economic Role and Power Beijing recognizes that the global economy is a major factor that increasingly influences China's security. The Chinese are acutely aware that the United States is the primary engine propelling the world economy forward. Sustained strength in the US economy is essential for China's economic growth as well as for the continuing recovery of Asian states from the financial crisis. Chinese economists worry that a major correction in US financial markets or a broader US economic downturn could have a devastating impact on China's economic modernization strategy.(3) Despite rhetorical statements declaring a need to diversify Chinese markets and expand domestic demand, Beijing remains exceedingly dependent on US markets to absorb its exports. The decision to make far reaching concessions to Washington in the bilateral negotiations on China's accession to the World Trade Organization signifies the judgment by Chinese leaders that economic globalization is inevitable and that although the process carries inherent risks, China will benefit from joining the globalization trend.(4) Chinese attitudes toward US economic power are obviously ambivalent, however. Chinese analysts of international affairs (in contrast to Chinese economists) especially emphasize that US economic strength has provided the foundation for stepped-up American political and military intervention. They worry that sustained US economic growth and its dominant position in scientific and technological development will encourage the United States to rely on unilateral means to achieve its global ambitions.(5) Military researchers point out that the expanding US economy has provided ample funds to support a continued increase in the US military budget. Some predict that the United States will take advantage of the weakening of the economic strength of many Asian countries to enhance American economic influence over the region.(6) US Intentions Toward China Since the Clinton administration set out its strategy of comprehensive engagement toward China in 1993, American strategy and intentions toward Beijing have been hotly debated topics among Chinese experts and officials. The events of 1999, most notably the accidental bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, have resulted in a narrowing of previously wide differences on this issue and produced a virtual consensus that the United States is striving to contain, constrain or otherwise check China. A leading analyst of American affairs noted privately in October 1999 that there is widespread acceptance in China that "the containment factor" is a prominent component in US policy toward China. In accordance with America's global strategic ambitions, the United States is viewed as being determined to prevent China from challenging its preeminent position regionally and globally. Many in China contend that the United States seeks to slow the growth of China's economic power as well as its development of science and technology to ensure that Chinese military weapons and capabilities continue to lag far behind those of the United States. Another US objective identified by Chinese is to promote democracy and the rule of law in China, which many believe extends to a desire to undermine Communist Party rule. Perpetuating the separation of Taiwan from the mainland is also considered to be an important goal of US strategy. The official characterization of US intentions by senior Chinese leaders and in official documents as aimed at "Westernizing," "splitting" and "weakening" China apparently now are widely accepted. US efforts to improve relations with states on China's periphery are interpreted by many in Beijing as intended to better position Washington for strategic competition with China in the future. The strengthening of the US-Japan military alliance, including the new Defense Guidelines, recently fortified US military arrangements with several Southeast Asian states as well as with Central Asian states bordering China, and US plans to deploy theater missile defense (TMD) systems in the region are cited by Chinese experts as evidence of a US strategic design to encircle China. Discussion of possible inclusion of Taiwan in a "regionwide" US defense missile system on China's periphery also has intensified Chinese suspicions that the United States views China as likely to emerge as a strategic adversary in the next century. A small number of liberal-minded, Western-educated Chinese experts view Washington's objectives in pursuing relations with Beijing as relatively benign and even in China's long-term national interests. For example, US goals of opening up the Chinese economy, promoting democracy and the rule of law in China, and encouraging Chinese adherence to global norms on everything from nuclear nonproliferation to military transparency to human rights are considered by these individuals as prodding Beijing to make policy choices that are difficult but essential for China's attainment of its aim of enhancing Chinese comprehensive national power in the new century. Even these experts are worried, however, that unprecedented US global power and its impatience for change in Chinese internal and external policies could result in increased US pressure on China that could have destabilizing consequences for Sino-American relations as well as regional and global stability. Many also are anxious about the dangerous mix of a continued trend toward independence in Taiwan, growing nationalistic fervor in China in support of the use of military force to prevent permanent separation of the island from the mainland, and increasingly resolute US determination to defend Taiwan from a Chinese military attack. US-Japan Alliance Chinese perspectives on the US-Japan alliance are undergoing a sea change.(7) In the past, Beijing judged that, on balance, the presence of American forces in Japan and the US nuclear umbrella over Japan benefited China by: effectively checking Japan's ambitions for regional hegemony; restraining the buildup of an independent Japanese military capability and limiting Japan's ability to project military power; and providing reassurance to other Asian states that worried about China's growing economic, political, and military power. In the early 1990s, China even feared that economic friction between Washington and Tokyo could spill over into the security realm and cause a rupture of the alliance, triggering Japanese rearmament. The signing of the Joint Declaration on the Alliance for the 21st Century by President Bill Clinton and Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto in April 1996 and the subsequent process of revising the Defense Guidelines governing wartime US-Japan cooperation prompted a heated debate in China about the US-Japan alliance and its impact on Chinese security interests. The Chinese suspect that the primary motive behind efforts by Tokyo and Washington to reinvigorate the security treaty and expand its area of coverage is a desire to counter the rise of Chinese power. In addition, the provision in the new guidelines that allows for US and Japanese forces to jointly respond to undefined emergencies in the Far East has heightened Chinese concern that the US and Japanese militaries will buttress their capabilities to respond with force in the event that Beijing seeks to militarily intimidate or take over Taiwan. China is increasingly skeptical about the role of the alliance in restricting Japan's acquisition of power projection forces. Chinese military and civilian analysts contend that the security treaty provides Japan with a cover to develop a broad range of military capabilities, and many forecast that Japan will eventually sever itself from the United States and pursue its security interests on its own. Instead of serving as a check on Japanese regional ambitions, the alliance is now viewed as accelerating Japan's development into a "normal" country that shoulders greater responsibility for regional security, a trend that China finds worrisome. The Chinese also maintain that modification of the Defense Guidelines to allow for regional wartime cooperation between American and Japanese forces has stimulated support in Japan for revising the Peace Constitution to include the right of "collective self-defense." Revision of Japan's constitution would mark a major watershed in Japanese post-World War II history and probably would have extremely negative consequences for Sino-Japanese relations. "
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Hawt! ......amazing as well.
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From this years Darwin tryouts ...and...
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I had put a little smiley gif that was bowing down in awe after that sentence but it didn't show up. I just want to say that's totally awesome!
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No kidding, I was reading this thread, thinking it was new and that I'd add my rattlesnake story when I get to my post in 2008 of the rattlesnake story..... I didn't remember posting that or this thread at all:-) Ujahn was cleaning a line off top down. He was telling me about this great crack that started up higher and how it would pro well. As he felt like he'd gotten all the loose stuff off, and there was no to minimal pro for the first 80 feet, I thought I'd do a quick lap up his fixed rope to get to the top of the wall and toss off if there was any loose rocks he'd left behind. Then I get up to this thing. I'm like, WTF? I can see all 4 sides, if it cuts loose, I'll die. If I put my fingers in that crack and it pulls, they'll be ground Chuck. Hmmm. I didn't see it till I was right on it, and he hadn't seen it at all looking down, yet it was of significant size. The flake from underneath: Ujahn cleaning right above and next to it: We pushed it off the next weekend. The route still has not seen an ascent.
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You're still going after a stage 3 Melonoma diagnosis in 2000? Holy crap!
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Give "awards" for climbing seems a violation of the spirit of what climbing should be. To me anyway. *cough* total bullshit* cough*
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Woot, that's my price range, but I need a tad larger, thanks!