sexual_chocolate

it was dark. i looked briefly For how long? 20 seconds? 10 seconds? So in your mind the idea of a shovel was formed? And you say it was dark? How dark? We all know crows roost for the night BEFORE it gets dark. Which part of your story would you like to recant?

Try camoflauging the extra bag.

I'm interested in how everyone jumps up in arms, but doesn't address a single actual issue regarding this. Why is this? Because it's an incredibly sensitive subject (obviously). And since you capitalize "scientist" above, I assume you are attacking his inability to fathom some sort of "scientific" concept or process? Maybe you could explain what you mean?

those motherfuckers go through my garbage can every friday, and guess what, MrStupidHuman, right now, after picking up all of the stuff they've thrown around, i'm tempted to get my 12 gauge out... a smart human would know how to safeguard a friggin' garbage can from a crow. Stupid human.

come on man, they don't torture their own kind.

"Functioning Dept. of "Justice""? Priceless.

but the salient point is really the shovel aspect. I doubt that he really looked. I think he made this up in hindsight, but when the pressure was on, he didn't know what to do (including looking for a shovel). That is my hypothesis.

bullshit. crows are smart and cool. stupid human.

I'm surprised that there wasn't a shovel around. Did you really look?

what's the current diagnosis?

along with the congress.... how could they ever justify to themselves confirming an ag who has said what this nominee has said? congress has been just as responsible for this erosion as bush etal.

anyone see frontline the other night? it's up to the next pres, because bush WON'T do it.

you cannot defines omething you cantf athom care to expand? since i have no idea what you are talking about....

funny, just showed those two vids to a friend an hour ago. i've never seen such such funky power as the breaker's got.

Here's where you are entirely wrong. The last hundred years of Mid-East policy has been a resounding success, playing out in a manner supported by BOTH parties (wow, we in this democracy really live in a two party state!). The US and other western nations have continued to maintain access ("access"? is this fair to say? is "control" more accurate?)to hydrocarbons through the machinations (and other market developments, manipulations etc) that we are speaking of in iran. the iranian blowback is certainly a consequence of this meddling, but to rate US foreign policy as a "failure" because of this instance is a bit over-reaching; i would think it would simply be called a statistical "necessity" in the bigger FP game of geopolitics. Actually not. For the trillions we've spent on our Middle Eastern policy, we could have been energy independent years ago. It has been a very poor investment. My post was from what i assume to be the cheney bush etal perspective, although i'm hardly sure that what you say is true.

oh my god! do you speak russian? oh my god that's so freaking awesome! i speak some other languages too, but i generally don't post in those languages cuz i know most others don't speak them, and i would look like a fool. But don't let that stop ya!

Wow, you can play the russian village idiot in a contemporary setting! Amazing! Does that come as a fringe benefit with graduating "magna cum filled pastry boy"?

i think it's the variable most often used. realpolitik and all. i'm not saying it's how i define "success", but it's certainly the metric used by many, including some at this site. as far as what's going on now.... i don't know if current events would deem the long term strategy a failure, quite honestly. yes, oil prices are high, but the US is sitting on the second largest known oil reserves, with contracts in hand (and this "prize" comes at a time when china's ravenous appetite gobbles up oil contracts globally, reducing an already dwindlng supply). No, I'd say even the current situation can be viewed a "success", possibly a resounding one at that. I mean come on, what's a few thousand US soldier deaths when the stakes are this high? what's a few hundred thousand deaths of "the other guy" within this scenario? Not much, evidently. I really hope your being sarcastic oh wise friend, why don't you tell me the most likely outlook of people like cheney etal and explain, with the current evidence in mind, how their thinking differs from the above analysis?

i think it's the variable most often used. realpolitik and all. i'm not saying it's how i define "success", but it's certainly the metric used by many, including some at this site. as far as what's going on now.... i don't know if current events would deem the long term strategy a failure, quite honestly. yes, oil prices are high, but the US is sitting on the second largest known oil reserves, with contracts in hand (and this "prize" comes at a time when china's ravenous appetite gobbles up oil contracts globally, reducing an already dwindlng supply). No, I'd say even the current situation can be viewed a "success", possibly a resounding one at that. I mean come on, what's a few thousand US soldier deaths when the stakes are this high? what's a few hundred thousand deaths of "the other guy" within this scenario? Not much, evidently.

Here's where you are entirely wrong. The last hundred years of Mid-East policy has been a resounding success, playing out in a manner supported by BOTH parties (wow, we in this democracy really live in a two party state!). The US and other western nations have continued to maintain access ("access"? is this fair to say? is "control" more accurate?)to hydrocarbons through the machinations (and other market developments, manipulations etc) that we are speaking of in iran. the iranian blowback is certainly a consequence of this meddling, but to rate US foreign policy as a "failure" because of this instance is a bit over-reaching; i would think it would simply be called a statistical "necessity" in the bigger FP game of geopolitics.

Huh???? That is among the most convoluted, uninformed, revisionist rants I've read in a while - and you're in good company here. I would rate it a blend somewhere between Virendra7 and Dave Schultz. How so?

You ask a question that you think you already know the answer to? Interesting. I'll correct you: I find the type of violence authorized and condoned and directed by the mullahs in iran to be nauseating. simple, really. First of all, it is open to debate whether or not the violence in iran has ever approached the violence of the shah's years; from what i've gathered, it has not, not even close, but this is really beside the point. Tell me who "applauds" the iranian theocracy? Tell me who "defends" it? Tell me who states that "it was an inevitable consequence of Western meddling in Iranian affairs"? Who is this chap that you refer to? I'd be interested in hearing how he might make these rather, in my mind, unsupportable posits (although each point offers an occasion for serious inquiry). maybe he's got a way of presenting things that makes sense? I don't know, I haven't met him. It seems there most certainly was secular opposition to the shah. And after the revolution, i would imagine that many found themselves to be in serious straights. Your point? Answer to penultimate question: interesting question. would the overthrow of mossadegh have happened without intervention? If the overthrow had not happened, how would the politics of the region have evolved? We see how the politics DID evolve, in no small part due to western meddling. maybe mossadegh would have turned into an unpopular autocrat himself, fomenting the conditions for another revolution. etc etc. So, can ALL that transpired be laid at western feet? sheesh, depends on your aperture setting. i would say some things can, some things can't, and many things one can't say whence or whither they arose. answer to last question: irrelevant.

Ok. I've got five minutes... Basically, your point about the overthrow of Mossadegh, and the overthrow of the MRS in 1979, portrays US foreign policy as something that is implemented seperately from domestic politics. I don't believe that. I think that US foreign policy is implicitly tied to domestic policy agendas. Eisenhower came into power, and trusted his British friends significantly more than Mossadegh. Ike thought Mossadegh was a wet handed thief. Mossadegh was, as I'm sure you know, rather ill at the time, and thought that he had lost his best hope of retaining the friendship of the Americans. Sure enough... And of course, Carter's election and his implementation of the human rights based foreign policy had a drastic and immediate effect on SAVAK and people seeking change within Iran. Reagan sought out the extreme islamofascists in his negotiations to secretly resolve the hostage crisis...again US domestic politics played trump over our foreign interests. While I probably agree with your conclusions, I prefer a significantly higher level of granularity and knowledge in my prognostication. Of course, black swan type events continue to happen, but it does make the conversation with my taxi drivers in Tabriz significantly more interesting. Finally, I believe, but am not sure, the one of Speaker Pelosi's oldest and best contributors has been lobbying for the armenian genocide bill. it's dinner time, have fun... I'm not quite sure how statements that i considered to be rather innocuous and event-based were construed as an indication of my belief in a domestic/foreign policy split? As for granularity, there are contextual contingencies with every situation; hell, even hitler still has his supporters and apologists, and, from their point of view, he acted in a noble and heroic way. There is no "granularity" that needs to be added to my understanding of modern Iranian history for me to continue to be sickened by the actions of both the british and the americans, since there is no ethical justification for these actions (although I appreciate any factual information). and who might this contributor be, and what might your position regarding the genocide bill be? and what do you see as the drivers of this bill?

Just for context: Iran elected, democratically, a president back in the '50's. The US didn't like this president, because he wanted to nationalize oil assets. So, the US worked in a direct way to foster a military revolution, replacing the legitimate president with a dictator. Needless to say, the dictator didn't become a very popular fellow in Iran, except with the monied classes. Unrest grew, and was squelched with means that compare to Saddam's previous methods. Finally, popular unrest reached proportions uncontrollable by the Shah, culminating in a popular Muslim nationalist overthrow of the government (and the take-over of the US embassy, understandably the target of years of pent-up frustration, since it was the US that kept the Shah in power). More Context... "On 28 April 1951, the Majlis named Mossadegh as new prime minister by a vote of 79-12. Aware of Mossadegh's rising popularity and political power, and with the assassination of Prime Minister Ali Razmara in March, the young Shah appointed Mossadegh to the Premiership. Shortly after coming to office, Mossadegh enforced the Oil Nationalization Act, which involved the nationalization of Iran’s oil, cancellation of the AIOC’s oil concession due to expire in 1993 and expropriation of the AIOC's assets. Responding to the latter, the British government announced it would not allow Mossadegh's government to export any oil produced in the formerly British-controlled refineries. A de facto blockade by Great Britain, enforced by threat of legal action was established in the Persian Gulf to prevent any attempts by Iran to ship oil out of the country. Furthermore, the AIOC withdrew its British trained technicians when Mossadegh nationalized the oil industry. Thus, many of the refineries lacked properly trained technicians that were needed to continue production. An economic stalemate thus ensued, with Mossadegh's government refusing to allow any British involvement in Iran's oil industry, and Britain refusing to allow any oil to leave Iran. Since Britain had long been Iran's primary oil-consumer and producer, the stalemate was particularly hard on Iran. While the country had once boasted over a US$100 million a year in exports to Britain, after nationalization, the same oil industry began increasing Iran's debt by nearly US$120 million a year. The Abadan Crisis quickly plunged the country into economic difficulties. Despite the economic hardships of his policy, Mossadegh remained popular, and in 1952, was approved by parliament for a second term. Sensing the difficulties of a worsening political and economic climate, he announced that he would ask the Shah to grant him emergency powers. Thus, during the royal approval of his new cabinet, Mossadegh insisted on the constitutional prerogative of the prime minister to name a Minister of War and the Chief of Staff. The Shah refused, and Mossadegh announced his resignation. Ahmad Qavam (also known as Ghavam os-Saltaneh) was appointed as Iran's new prime minister. On the day of his appointment, he announced his intention to resume negotiations with the British to end the oil dispute. This blatant reversal of Mossadegh's plans sparked a massive public outrage. Protestors of all stripes filled the streets, including communists and radical Muslims led by Ayatollah Kashani. Frightened by the unrest, the Shah quickly dismissed Qavam, and re-appointed Mossadegh, granting him the full control of the military he had previously demanded. Taking advantage of his popularity, Mossadegh convinced the parliament to grant him increased powers and appointed Ayatollah Kashani as house speaker. Kashani's Islamic scholars, as well as the Tudeh Party, proved to be two of Mossadegh's key political allies, although both relationships were often strained. The already precarious alliance between Mossadegh and Kashani was severed in January 1953, when Kashani opposed Mossadegh's demand that his increased powers be extended for a period of one year. Mossadegh quickly implemented more sociopolitical changes. Iran's centuries old feudal agriculture sector was abolished, and replaced with a system of collective farming and government land ownership. Although Mossadegh has previously been opposed to these policies when implemented unilaterally by the Shah, he saw it as a means of checking the power of the Tudeh Party which had been agitating for general land reform among the peasants..." Still More Context Sweet morsels:

No, but then again, my friendships don't tend to be dependent on lame duck presidents and I will do my best to make friends with the incoming administration, I promise! Shoot. I was trying to make a point about the counter revolution, the take over by the islamofascists and their usage of the war and the help from new friend in DC (pesky american elections again)... Oh well. edited for bad grammer and the forgotten words "don't tend to be dependent" next, edit for poor communication of meaning and intent (yes i know, a bit subjective; mebbe you're writing a nice poem a la virendra7, and i'm dissing your artistry. if this is the case, my apologies, and perhaps you could parse it for me....).