JayB

Love the Fred Thompsonesque auto-congratulatory flourish that gets tethered to the end of every rebuttal, though.

If it's the only factor that they cite - repeatedly - then it seems reasonable to conclude that they are either unaware other factors, or choosing not to incorporate them into their analysis for some reason.

There also seems to be no comprehension of the fact that some "solutions" could generate more suffering and misery than the warming itself. Also that there may be ways to spend money that reduce aggregate human suffering more effectively and promptly than by curtailing planet-wide warming by a couple of degrees. Also duly noted that the matter of which discount rate to use when projecting costs associated with addressing global warming into the future has yet to even enter the discussion here. This is probably the single most important factor in determining which estimates to base responses on, how much things will cost, etc.

I just think it's kind of silly to base your understanding of something as complex as the history of the middle east in the 20th century on a single variable. While some of the appeal and subsequent political successes of Islamists in the Middle East can be attributed to "blowback" against the US in particular or the West in general, it seems quite unreasonable to conclude that there are no other legacies, dynamics, perogatives, etc operating within the Middle East that have some bearing on this question. Egypt provides a case in point. Islamists tried to kill Nasser - Mister Pan-Arab-Nationalist-and-Heroic-Defier-of-the-West - twice. Ever wonder what their motivations were for doing so, and if they might have been acting in response to motivations that had their genesis outside of a direct response to US foreign policy? Why was it that Khomeni's message, rather than that of the other factions who opposed the Shah, that had the greatest traction in Iran? Pointless tangents? I'm not so sure.

Weren't you the one mocking those not-practicing the art who profess differing opinions? Or did I just imagine your condescension? Opponents of Global Warming are fighting a rearguard action. It shows. Since the person in question is neither an "opponent of global warming," nor professing an opinion that differs from the consensus of those who are practicing the art - I am not sure where you are going with this. Great contribution to the dialogue, though.

Me, I have no problem whatsoever say it was an inevitable consequence of U.S. meddling in Iranian affairs. I was around countless brown-bag, anti-Shah demonstrations and knew more than a few highly disaffected Iranians in the movement to overthrow the Shah. And most all of these folks had no shortage of personal stories to recount relative to the savage level of violence employed by the Shah's security forces. The bottom line in Iran was we attempted to play them, and the entire region, like they were just another country in Latin America where the real roots of U.S. foreign policy lie. In fact, the last hundred years of Mid-East policy has basically been a continous disaster because we keep trying to manage and manipulate cultures and tribes in the Mid-East like they are in Central America. The essential problem however, is there are no Latin suicide bombers - Latin cultures are nothing like Mid-Eastern cultures and you simply can't operate with the same mindset in Sana'a as you do in Santiago and expect the same results. And that's basically what we've been doing again and again in the Mid-East. The Iran-Contra Affair was the recent pinnacle of this disfunctional thinking. You'd think we'd learn eventually - U.S. Mid-East policy and 'diplomacy' has been like the longest running sitcom ever for the amusement of generations of British diplomats. Hell, even our Latin neighbors are finally "getting" it, even if it took them a 100 years. Chavez, Saddam, the Shah, and Ahmadinejad were/are very much creations of a U.S. foreign policy that has been stuck in a revolving, time-warped turnstile still steam-driven by Rockefeller-era corporate sensibilities. Each decade we reap a hard bite on the ass from seeds sewn in many previous decades and yet each time we cry anew, "It's a outrage! How could this evil be happening to us!" Even more miraculously, a mirror is never at hand when we we attempt to clearly point out where the true evil lies, which is generally at our feet - we need merely look where we're aiming our gun. So, clueless as ever, the beat goes on - and everywhere in Africa and South America, that beat is backing lyrics sung in the language everyone on those two continents is suddenly clamouring to learn - Mandarin. Is it vanity or pride that keeps the American Right steadfastly blind and unable to entertain even the remote possibility that many of the affronts to the United States aren't a reaction to our successes, but rather to our excesses?. And is it stupidity or self-loathing that keeps the American Left from realizing that reactionary cultural responses to U.S. hedgemony are only rarely cuddly and good tourist destinations? And how hard is it to realize some of the basic, common sense approaches so useful for getting along in third grade would go a long way in today's world. It'd be interesting to see this model extended to the political dynamics in, say, Egypt. The rise of the Muslim brotherhood, the attempts to assassinate Nasser, the assassination of Sadat - all a response to exogenous forces? There was a long history of democratic rule in the middle east, in which repression was unknown prior to Western meddling, was there? Ditto for Latin America. Land of milk and honey from time immemorial until the US got involved? There are no endogenous forces, mechanisms, ideologies, classes that bear any responsibility for the mire of poverty, corruption, incompetence and failure that's largely prevailed there?

Incidents in question involved folks who were in situations where they'd have had extreme difficulty easing the load on the rope even for a few seconds. I wasn't dealing with completely incapacitated or unconscious seconds, in which case other measures might have been necessary - but merely folks who weren't having a good time and really wanted and/or needed to be lowered to the ground ASAP. At the time - all I could think of were more complicated, more time consuming ways to unload the Reverso, and it seemed to me that there had to be an easier way to do things. The method I proposed works (I used it to easily unlock a 160lb free-hanging load, and I rigged it up in about 20 seconds) - but Petzl's method is better so that's what I'll use going forward.

So agreeing with the scientific consensus, or at least differing to the judgments of those most qualified to evaluate the evidence, somehow constitutes a critique of the said consensus? 'kay. The larger point is that even if one accepts that global warming is real, and that anthropogenic emissions are the most important factor driving global warming - there are still important discussions that need to take place concerning the assumptions about the probable costs and benefits, the assumptions that are factored into the said analyses, etc.

The nausea doesn't extent to the actions taken and actions established by Mullahs in charge of Iran since 1979? Interesting. Had they established a state where all of the rights and freedoms that leftists of a certain stripe - not those who spent the interval between 1917 and 1989 apologizing for the various marxo-totalitarianisms that blighted the globe during that era - used to consider desirable, this might be understandable. Establishing Persian Netherlands out of the ashes of the Shah's dictatorship...yes, I can see why one might applaud that. Establishing an Islamist petro-theocracy where the repression, constraints on personal freedoms, the liquidation of opponents of the regime, etc rival those enforced by the Shah, at the very least - why one might applaud that, or defend it, or proclaim that it was an inevitable consequence of Western meddling in Iranian affairs is more difficult to comprehend. Do you really believe that there was no secular opposition to the Shah? Ever wonder what may have happened to them and everything that they represented after Khomeni took over? Can all that transpired before and after the Revolution that brought the mullahs to power in Iran be laid at the feet of agents outside of Islam and Iran? That actors within Iran had no inspirations, motives, or interests other than those that formed as a direct reaction against Western patronage of the Shah?

Just for context: Iran elected, democratically, a president back in the '50's. The US didn't like this president, because he wanted to nationalize oil assets. So, the US worked in a direct way to foster a military revolution, replacing the legitimate president with a dictator. Needless to say, the dictator didn't become a very popular fellow in Iran, except with the monied classes. Unrest grew, and was squelched with means that compare to Saddam's previous methods. Finally, popular unrest reached proportions uncontrollable by the Shah, culminating in a popular Muslim nationalist overthrow of the government (and the take-over of the US embassy, understandably the target of years of pent-up frustration, since it was the US that kept the Shah in power). More Context... "On 28 April 1951, the Majlis named Mossadegh as new prime minister by a vote of 79-12. Aware of Mossadegh's rising popularity and political power, and with the assassination of Prime Minister Ali Razmara in March, the young Shah appointed Mossadegh to the Premiership. Shortly after coming to office, Mossadegh enforced the Oil Nationalization Act, which involved the nationalization of Iran’s oil, cancellation of the AIOC’s oil concession due to expire in 1993 and expropriation of the AIOC's assets. Responding to the latter, the British government announced it would not allow Mossadegh's government to export any oil produced in the formerly British-controlled refineries. A de facto blockade by Great Britain, enforced by threat of legal action was established in the Persian Gulf to prevent any attempts by Iran to ship oil out of the country. Furthermore, the AIOC withdrew its British trained technicians when Mossadegh nationalized the oil industry. Thus, many of the refineries lacked properly trained technicians that were needed to continue production. An economic stalemate thus ensued, with Mossadegh's government refusing to allow any British involvement in Iran's oil industry, and Britain refusing to allow any oil to leave Iran. Since Britain had long been Iran's primary oil-consumer and producer, the stalemate was particularly hard on Iran. While the country had once boasted over a US$100 million a year in exports to Britain, after nationalization, the same oil industry began increasing Iran's debt by nearly US$120 million a year. The Abadan Crisis quickly plunged the country into economic difficulties. Despite the economic hardships of his policy, Mossadegh remained popular, and in 1952, was approved by parliament for a second term. Sensing the difficulties of a worsening political and economic climate, he announced that he would ask the Shah to grant him emergency powers. Thus, during the royal approval of his new cabinet, Mossadegh insisted on the constitutional prerogative of the prime minister to name a Minister of War and the Chief of Staff. The Shah refused, and Mossadegh announced his resignation. Ahmad Qavam (also known as Ghavam os-Saltaneh) was appointed as Iran's new prime minister. On the day of his appointment, he announced his intention to resume negotiations with the British to end the oil dispute. This blatant reversal of Mossadegh's plans sparked a massive public outrage. Protestors of all stripes filled the streets, including communists and radical Muslims led by Ayatollah Kashani. Frightened by the unrest, the Shah quickly dismissed Qavam, and re-appointed Mossadegh, granting him the full control of the military he had previously demanded. Taking advantage of his popularity, Mossadegh convinced the parliament to grant him increased powers and appointed Ayatollah Kashani as house speaker. Kashani's Islamic scholars, as well as the Tudeh Party, proved to be two of Mossadegh's key political allies, although both relationships were often strained. The already precarious alliance between Mossadegh and Kashani was severed in January 1953, when Kashani opposed Mossadegh's demand that his increased powers be extended for a period of one year. Mossadegh quickly implemented more sociopolitical changes. Iran's centuries old feudal agriculture sector was abolished, and replaced with a system of collective farming and government land ownership. Although Mossadegh has previously been opposed to these policies when implemented unilaterally by the Shah, he saw it as a means of checking the power of the Tudeh Party which had been agitating for general land reform among the peasants..." Still More Context

"There is no doubt that mankind has influenced atmospheric concentrations of CO2, and that this will increase global temperatures. I don’t believe that the scientific data supports anything other than that an increase in CO2 will cause an increase in temperatures. The important scientific discussion centres on how much the temperatures will rise. Writing in The Guardian recently, the commentator George Monbiot ridiculed global warming deniers under the headline “Fossil Fools”. Such criticism is well founded." What aspect of the science is he criticizing here? Policy recommendations made by scientists are one thing, science is another.

More... http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/14/business/14scene.html?_r=1&oref=slogin

Or just click on this link... http://www.becker-posner-blog.com/archives/2007/02/global_warming_1.html

"Bjorn Lomborg WHEN disaster strikes or a threat looms, our natural human response is to take drastic action. Instead of examining our options we embrace the first reasonable-sounding idea and rush to implement it. If somebody asks us to stop and consider another way, we are exasperated. “This isn’t the time for consultation or lengthy decision-making”, we reply. “We’ve got to do something.” Our reaction to climate change is typical of this intuitive desire to take drastic rather than rational action. The science is clear: although global climate change will not result in sudden catastrophe — it will not decrease food production or increase the impact of malaria — it is a reality. There is no doubt that mankind has influenced atmospheric concentrations of CO2, and that this will increase global temperatures. I don’t believe that the scientific data supports anything other than that an increase in CO2 will cause an increase in temperatures. The important scientific discussion centres on how much the temperatures will rise. Writing in The Guardian recently, the commentator George Monbiot ridiculed global warming deniers under the headline “Fossil Fools”. Such criticism is well founded. However, I would challenge those such as Monbiot — supporters of a strong response to climate change — likewise to stop denying the economics of global warming. I am the exasperating person who is standing still in the face of a looming threat, asking whether we should stop and consider the rationale and suitability of our planned response. I ask that we look at what can be achieved and what it will cost — and then see if our proposed solution measures up, or whether we would do better putting our efforts elsewhere. Humanity faces many other challenges: malnutrition, conflict and communicable disease are just three that we devote many resources to overcoming. Estimates indicate that the total cost of global warming will be about $5 trillion (£2.8 trillion). This calculation is unavoidably uncertain, but is based on models designed to assess the impact on areas such as forestry, fisheries, energy, water supply, infrastructure, hurricane damage, drought damage, coast protection, land loss caused by a rise in sea level, loss of wetlands, forest loss, loss of species, loss of human life, pollution and migration. The damage will not be spread evenly around the globe. Developing nations will be the hardest hit. They are poor and have less capacity to adapt. Industrialised countries may even benefit from a warming of less than two or three degrees celsius. The Kyoto Protocol aims to cut participating nations’ carbon emissions to 5.2 per cent below 1990 levels by 2010. Even if the United States joins in, the effect on the climate will be tiny, postponing temperature change by just six years at the end of this century. In other words, the Bangladeshi family who would have had to move to higher ground in 2100, would now have until 2106. This does a little good, but not much. The cost of the Kyoto Protocol will be at least $150 billion a year, and possibly much more. If we were to go even further — as many suggest — and curb global emissions to their 1990 levels, the total net cost to the world would be about $4 trillion extra — comparable to the cost of global warming itself. For the price of just one year of implementing the Kyoto Protocol, we could instead provide clean drinking water and sanitation to the entire world. It is estimated that doing so would save two million lives and prevent half a billion people from becoming seriously ill every year. We would not just be helping future inhabitants of the developing world — as the Kyoto Protocol will very slightly — but benefiting people of the Third World today and, through them, their descendants. We would boost the economies of developing nations, and thus help them to respond to climate change. I challenge those such as George Monbiot to explain how doing so little, at such a high cost, can possibly be the best idea around. The harsh truth is that we don’t have money for everything. I believe our spending should be prioritised on the basis of its costs and benefits — aiming to do the most good in the world with every dollar spent. Some find it blasphemous to set priorities when it comes to the grand challenges facing our planet. Comparing global warming and the spread of HIV-Aids is like comparing apples and oranges, they say. Besides, we ought to have money to handle it all. Prioritising does mean comparing apples and oranges, but every public policy decision requires choices. Governments compare healthcare with education spending and decide their priorities in annual budgets. Doing good for the world is no different; every dollar spent on one project is a dollar less for another. This month a group of leading thinkers will attempt to provide the world with a rational basis for such decisions. Nine illustrious economists — including four Nobel laureates — will meet as part of the Copenhagen Consensus, organised by the Danish Environmental Assessment Institute. The economists will examine ten of the greatest challenges facing the world, ranging from climate change and communicable disease to conflicts, malnutrition and trade barriers. They will look at the costs and benefits of solutions to each problem, and provide a prioritised list of how to do the most good with every dollar we spend. Often critics point out that my messages are used — or misused — in the political process. Recently a leaked memo showed that the Bush Administration was using selected portions of my book, The Skeptical Environmentalist, as part of a media strategy to counter environmental concerns. It is true that politicians such as President Bush probably only pay attention to half of what I say about global warming. He hears that “implementing the Kyoto Protocol is not a sound use of money”, but switches off when I finish the sentence with, “and that money should be used to provide clean drinking water and sanitation to the Third World.” Those on the other side of the political spectrum have similar hearing problems. They hear, “global warming is a serious problem,” but ignore the message that “simple economics tells us that doing something about it is a pretty bad investment”. If, as I argue, the Kyoto Protocol is not an effective solution, it does not follow that we should do nothing about global warming. For example, a tenfold increase in funding for research and development for renewable energy sources would only amount to about 1 per cent of the costs of Kyoto, yet in the long term would achieve much more. The costs of energy sources, such as solar and wind power, have been dropping about 50 per cent a decade over the past 30 years. Even if costs decrease at a lower rate, say 30 per cent, these energy sources will start becoming competitive by mid-century. Increased research and development might bring that day forward by five to ten years. We should remember that dealing with global warming is not about making expensive, symbolic efforts to cut carbon emissions now — it should be about making sure that our children and grandchildren will stop using fossil fuels because we have provided them with better and cheaper alternatives. By choosing a more rational answer to climate change than Kyoto, we will acknowledge the fact that the world is confronted not by one massive looming threat, but by a range of challenges. None of these will destroy the planet, but they destroy lives every day, particularly in the Third World. In an ideal world, we would be able to spend trillions of dollars combating global warming, and defeat every other cause of widespread human suffering too. But in a world where we cannot do everything, we must decide priorities. And in such a world, it is not clear that, however well-intentioned, the Kyoto Protocol survives a collision with reality." http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/columnists/guest_contributors/article420822.ece Cost Estimates and Global Warming: http://www.greenhouse.gov.au/impacts/publications/pubs/costing.pdf Plug "Discount Rate Global Warming" into Google for more interesting reading.

For some... It'd be interesting to see how many Academy Award winners for Best Picture people can name off of the top of their heads versus Nobel Peace Prize Winners. Yasser Arafat is the first name that always springs to mind when I think of the Nobel Prize in this category.

How would that benefit Turkey? Seems like they'd need some tangible benefit in exchange for effectively deep-sixing any hope they ever had of gaining EU membership by pissing off the single most important sponsor of those ambitions. I can see how that might benefit Russia in the short-term by keeping oil-prices high, but there are risks to overplaying the hydrocarbon card as well.

I generally agree with that sentiment, but one could make the same statement concerning scientists championing specific policies to address C02 emissions when they have next to no qualifications or experience in the areas that are necessary to construct them well. One reason why I thought that this work was so interesting is that it deals with how to (and not to) structure incentive systems to best achieve a specific outcome in cases where you're dealing with public goods.

Interesting.

Fascinating stuff. Actually has some bearing on the "C02 Emissions Problem," and Gore and his acolytes would do well to acquaint themselves with it. http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/2007/ecoadv07.pdf

Good thing it's worth it.

I'm a big fan of Norman Borlaug, and the work that he performed is vastly more significant than, and quite beyond, anything that Gore could ever accomplish in terms of its direct benefits to humanity - but I think that Borlaug was a strange choice, and that his nomination was as nearly as far off the mark as Gore's. The criteria for awarding the prize have been so vague, nebulous, and off the mark for so long that the award has been rendered both meaningless and worthless IMO.

I was being sarcastic about "renegade" historians inferring a connection between the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union. While ever-deepening poverty and worsening repression are inevitable under communism, and collapse is predictable - the date at which it occurs is not. Was the collapse destined to happen in the late 80's irrespective of what the West did? I think that's a difficult point to argue.

His strategic initiatives put him in a more effective position to negotiate in a manner that effectively ended both the Cold War and, as you suggest, accelerate the end of the Soviet Union. There are some renegade historians who haven suggested that the coincident occurrence was non-random. Playing a decisive roll in bringing a 40 year old conflict in which the end of civilization via hostile exchange of ICBM's was a possibility that serious people had to contemplate, and which had spawned open conflict in a series of proxy wars might be considered consistent with advancing peace in some circles. Tell me more about these multiple episodes of near nuclear destruction, though. I'm quite familiar with the Cuban Missile Crisis, but would like to learn more about escalations of an equal magnitude and severity that occurred in the eighties.

Microlending = economic development Green-Belts = reforestation & clean drinking water I must have missed the calls to fundamentally reorder civilization in order to advance either cause.

Reagan was a hell of a lot more deserving than Gore, and the absence of his name from the roster tells you more about the ideological precommitments of the folks in Stockholm than it does about the actual merits of the nominees. Of the people still around, Tony Blair's has accomplished far more in the arena of actually brokering peace than Gore ever has or will. Ditto for Clinton's work in the Balkans.